Avoiding Syria and Libya: Lessons for Ethiopia
- The Long-term cost of minority dominated dictatorship and the prospect for transition to democracy
Jawar Mohammed|September 4, 2012
(NB: This essay was drafted before Meles Zenawi fell ill and was put on hold until things clear up. Attempt has been made to update it with the new developments)
Following the popular uprisings throughout North Africa and the Middle East, both democracy activists as well as those working to preserve the status quo are closely watching this incredible moment. While Tunisia and Egypt experienced a quick and orderly downfall of dictatorships, the uprisings in Libya and Syria turned bloody. Yemen falls somewhere in between. One of the factors that differentiate the orderly fall of a strongman from the bloody and protracted civil war is the level of sectarian concentration of power.
Three themes will be addressed in this essay. Why do certain authoritarian regimes exercise blatant discrimination when distributing rent – i.e. political power and wealth? How could such regimes concentrate power and wealth in the hands of small sectarian groups and remain in power for so long? Finally, what kind of transition is likely to take place in such situations?
Let us start with a brief look at how each of the three regimes evolved.In Syria and Libya, the status quo is characterized by extensive concentration of economic privilege and political power in the hands of a single ethnic/religious group, with the vast majority excluded. Under such conditions, transitions could only be achieved after the old regime is completely obliterated, including its support base and institutions. A cursory look at how these two countries got into their respective situations shows a remarkable similarity to the developments in Ethiopia in the last two decades.
Libya: The tragedy of the Qadhadhfa tribe; from have it all to lose it all
When 27-year-old Moammar Gaddafi staged a coup d’etat in 1969, his small Qadhadhfa tribe was a little known marginal group located in the northwestern Libyan desert. By the time the popular uprising against his rule erupted in 2011, his once insignificant tribe became so powerful that Gaddafi offered their once nonexistent village of Sirte as a seat for the the African Union.
Under the cover of Nasserist Pan-Arab rhetoric, the core of Gaddafi’s coup coconspirators were officers of the Qadhadhfa. Hence although initially he promised a collective leadership made up of mid-rank officers, Gadaffi eventually resorted to clan loyalty. Writing for Think Africa Press, Jan De Haansta
“despite Gaddafi’s rhetoric of Arab socialism and a post-tribal Libya, he always remained strongly aware of the potential threat to his power posed by other tribes and, in the process, ending up exacerbating tribal tensions.”
Having survived the first coup attempt a few months after taking power, he began surrounding himself by officers from his tribe. When these aroused opposition from officers who belonged to other tribes, he purged them and filled their place by recruiting more soldiers from Qadhadhfa. Gaddafi faced multiple coups, the most serious ones in 1975 and 1979 by officers and bureaucrats that despised his increasingly dictatorial and discriminatory policies. Once he “cleansed” the military of troublemakers and replaced them with his tribal kinsmen, the opposition took on the form of Islamic insurgency – which, thanks to the open desert, he was able to easily quash.
The more threats he faced the more blatant his favoritism towards his tribe became. Cognizant of the fact that in such an open desert country conditions are unfavorable for insurgency, therefore the only internal threat would come from the military, he gradually and systematically weakened the army through purges and defunding. Gaddafi understood his tiny tribe was numerically too small to fill up a real army. So, he disabled the army and strengthened the revolutionary guard of a few brigades filled with soldiers from his tribe and mercenaries from neighboring countries, and commanded either by his sons or close relatives. In this way he neutralized the army while increasing his own security.
Besides concentration of power, the Qadhadhfa tribesmen accumulated enormous wealth and dominated the economy. In addition to disproportionate distribution of oil revenue to his tribe and the region, Gaddafi ensured Qadhadhfa business elites benefited from skewed competition and government subsidy. Gaddafi’s immediate family sat at the top of the business class owning or running most of the major corporations.
In explaining why the Libyan revolution was not as quick as that of Tunisia and Egypt, John Hamilton wrote:
“[Gaddafi] stuffed the lists of regional military governors, Republican Guard leaders and Revolutionary Committee members with members of his own tribe, the Qadhadhfa. Because of its relatively lowly status in the hierarchy, it is unlikely that the majority of the population would accept another of its members wielding power in Gaddafi’s place: that means the entire regime has its back to the wall, not just its leader.”
Inevitably, the struggle against Gaddafi practically became a struggle against the interest and security of Qadhadhfa tribe, who owed their power and privilege to Gaddafi, and stood to lose it all if he was toppled. They fought to the last minute, and went from having it all to losing it all when Sirte fell on the death of Gaddafi. Having suffered debilitating casualties during the war, and guilt-stricken for the mass atrocities they committed, the Qadhadhfa have little if any role in the power politics of the new Libya.
Syria: The Making and unmaking of the Alawite Monopoly
In an article published in 1989 Daniel Pipes, an expert on Middle Eastern politics, wrote
“For many centuries, the ‘Alawis[ who make up 13% of the population] were the weakest, poorest, most rural, most despised, and most backward people of Syria. In recent years, however, they have transformed themselves into the ruling elite of Damascus. Today, ‘Alawis dominate the government, hold key military positions, enjoy a disproportionate share of the educational resources, and are becoming wealthy.”
Four decades after Alawites took state power, and twenty three years since Pipes penned this observation, what is the consequence of such Alawite domination for the contemporary politics of Syria?
During the first two decades of its independence, Syria experienced extreme political instability, marked by numerous coups and counter-coups. Stability was restored only after Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970. Having watched that neither military rank nor ideological support insulated his numerous predecessors from coups, Assad believed that only a patronage system based on primordial identity could help him create a reliable and loyal support base. Thus, as a politically ambitious young military officer, he created a clandestine group of Alawites within the military and the Ba’th party. A prominent member of the military committee that staged the 1963 and 1966 coups, by the time he officially took power in 1970 through another coup, Assad had already built a strong Alawite block within the Baath party, and this block immediately dominated his government. Assad also forged alliances with the Alawite and Druze business classes. The two minority groups who long complained about discrimination by the Sunni majority have had strong reasons to help him consolidate power.
Although Syrian and foreign observers alike were alarmed by such concentration of power in the hands of the minority, they rationalized it as an acceptable price for ending the immediate political crisis. Basically, if Alawites could usher a new era of stability in the country, went their thinking, let them do it. However, the increasing domination began to stir resentment among the Sunni majority. The regime responded by purging Sunnis from the military and security. Alawites were recruited to the military en masse to replace the purged Sunnis. In a recent essay on the roots of the Alawite-Sunni rivalry, AyseTekdalFildis notes that
“after the [November 1970] coup, the gaps in the army resulting from purges of political opponents were filled by Alawites…the representation of Alawites among the newly appointed officers was as high as 90 percent.”
This was followed by development of a skewed economic scheme in which Sunni businesses considered to be disloyal were systematically pushed out, giving Alawites economic control.
In the 1980s, the tension rose to armed confrontation, as Sunni rebels targeted Alawite elites for assassination. In return, Assad responded by ordering the bombing of Hama – resulting in a massacre of 40,000 civilians. Having soaked its hand in blood, the regime had lost any chance of reconciling with the Sunnis; its only option for remaining in power was to strengthen and further secure the loyalty of the Alawites. In addition to continuous favouritism, fear-mongering propaganda was employed in which, theSunnis were portrayed as savages who will turn back the clock to the old days of domination and destroy the Alawites if Assad was to lose power. Four decades later, the regime and Alawites have become two sides of the same coin welded together with blood and privilege. For the Alawites, defending the regime became a necessity for defending the future existence of their people. For the opposition, fighting dictatorship meant fighting the Alawites who are at defensive line.
Therefore, close observers of the country’s politics were not surprised when the popular uprising that began in March 2011 quickly turned into a sectarian civil war. A recent report by the Associated Press notes that
“Sectarian slayings between Syria’s Sunni majority and the Alawite minority have been a brutal reality of Syria’s 17-month-old conflict, and they have only accelerated as the country falls into outright civil war. Sunnis have largely backed the uprising against Assad’s rule, while the Alawites — members of an offshoot of Shiism — have firmly stood behind the regime, where they fill the leadership ranks.”
The regime’s brutal attack on civilian protesters during the early stages of the conflict resulted in a defection of low-ranking Sunni members of the military, followed by the purging and execution of officers suspected of being disloyal. Assad’s paranoia reached its peak when the most senior security personnel of the regime were blown up at the intelligence headquarters. Soon after, the highest-ranking Sunni member of the cabinet, the Prime Minister, had to defect in order to save himself from the anger, fear and suspicion that gripped the Alawite elites.
As the above-mentioned report by the AP indicates, as “tit-for-tat killings have increased, so has the segregation of the two communities”. Yet such segregation does not seem to be a result of communal violence alone, but part of an exit strategy by a regime whose hold on much of the country is rapidly depleting. As Franck Salameh argues,
” The grisly massacres running riot through the Syrian countryside are not mere sectarian outbursts or bouts of senseless killings and retaliatory counter killings… what they entail in terms of displacements, deportations and population movements—are nothing if not the groundwork of a future Alawite entity; the grafting of new facts on the ground and the drafting of new frontiers. No longer able to rule in the name of Arab unity (and in the process preserve their own ethnic and sectarian autonomy), the Alawites may retreat into the Levantine highlands overlooking the Mediterranean.”
Therefore, just like Gaddafi, Assad seems to be preparing to flee to his home and try to form a separate state that he can rule and protect his and his group’s interests. Only time will tell whether this strategy will help avoid Gaddafi’s fate – because by the time Assad gives up on Damascus, the military and security apparatus tirelessly built by his father would be severely damaged and unlikely to provide him a safe-haven in a new breakaway state.
In that 1989 piece quoted above, Daniel Pipes prophesied:
“It appears inevitable that the ‘Alawis – still a small and despised minority, for all their present power – will eventually lose their control over Syria. When this happens, it is likely that conflicts along communal lines will bring them down, with the critical battle taking place between the ‘Alawi rulers and the Sunni majority. In this sense, the ‘Alawis’ fall – be it through assassinations of top figures, a palace coup, or a regional revolt – is likely to resemble their rise.”
Sadly, this prediction has been realized with the ongoing popular armed uprising. Not only the hegemony of the Alawite elites is rapidly crumbling, but also the social fabric, economic and military foundation of the Syrian state and society is being destroyed. Whether to protect themselves from internal threat or to justify their domination by earning nationalist credentials, the Alawite elites built strong military, intelligence institution that had made Syria one of the most powerful regional players. Unfortunately by excluding the rest of the population from genuinely taking part in such national project and denying them equitable share, they made the current civil war inevitable. The elites’ quest for eternal domination resulted in more marginalization of their Alawite community and left the Syrian state weaker than ever before.
34 Responses to Avoiding Syria and Libya: Lessons for Ethiopia
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About Jawar
Dear Jawar,
Thanks a lot for your article. Well analyzed, written and presented! I have a great respect for you and your articles. I have been reading your articles and following you in every post on FB, interviews and websites. I like they way you scientifically present your thought based on the existing truth. Generally, I say long live for Oromo and we need thousands intellectuals like you for our freedom. Freedom is coming soon!!! It is not a time for minor groups to rule, against the meaning of democracy! Time will come when every African nations is politically and economically free from Western and be united!
Oromia shall be free!
Nice article. Well researched. I enjoyed reading it. Why don’t you send this to HD and see what he thinks of it? Really.
Dear Tola:
I like and appreciate the analysis of Jawar, but not your sectarian views. I have Oromo, Amara and Gurage blood. You still want to divide us, just like feudal Ethiopia of some 300 years ago. If you are a good Oromo, you should try to thinks and act like the 21st century.
Dear Tola since you have no nationality please don
not participate on such kind,second are you the man of 21st century man>?……amazing….even being man of this century you cannot be a cattle of 21st century…gaddem
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a brief account of the minority based totalitarianism, the way they appear, develop and end! The similarities among such totalitarians are not limited to their foundations, however. Each and every detailed techniques of their operation share many common features. Among others, the way the Assad uses the state media (TV) is the exact replica of what we see in Ethiopia-recruiting the interview, instructing them what to say…etc. The Shabia militants (what Assad calls ‘armed gangs’ to the outsiders) are clandestinely armed by himself to take brutal actions against civilians’ demonstrations just to exculpate himself from their mass massacres; some thing that Agazi is doing in Ethiopia, though not as wisely as the syrian shabias.
This article teaches every players in the Ethiopian politics-from the incumbent minority dictators to the opposition group. The former should learn that all their actions are optimal at best only in the short run with a devastating long run consequences.
Mr Kassu,
You try to condemn Tolaa (Jawar) for dividing ‘us’ (who ever you might be). At the same time, you are diving Oromos into pre and of the ’21st century’. Pre or post 21st century, Oromos are Oromos – all the time. You also try to give him a qualifying adjective of your own choice – ‘good Oromo’.
From long experiences, we already know what you mean by ‘good Oromo’ and ‘bad Oromo’. I understand that, you can’t stand an Oromo who speaks up to defend the national interests of his people. For you, such an Oromo fails into the category of ‘bad Oromos’. Too bad for you.
I advice you to keep such adjectives; ‘bad and good’, ‘pure’ and ‘dirty’ Ethiopians to your community.
Oromiyaan ni Bilisoomti!
Dear Kassu!
So now your mixed ethnic back ground’s right trumps our
rights to exist as people? Where did you get that idea from.
Dear Kassu!
So now your mixed ethnic back ground’s right trumps our
rights to exist as people? Where did you get that idea from?
Thank you our best scholar, we always love, for you wonderful, timely and comprehensive article.
You are a role model for our young generation particularly of Oromo.
I was expecting you post this very timely and essay after I tuned to your interview on ESAT. How ever it seems tacitly related to they way the minority regime in our country use to benefit its narrow ethnic pp. In economy and military. Jawar,I think it would be much better if you would have discussed a little about the client politics in Ethiopia as it it related to Liabia and Syria.This is article is a good walk up alarm both for the similar regimes like that of ours. Their temporary dominant will come to end though it may be bloody.
I was sleepy when I wrote the above comment. Sorry for the inconvenience for so many mis spelling and poor organization. Any way I hope you can understand my point.
Dear Kassu,
Thank you for your view in my comment,
I believe, taking about unity by no means a measurement for being civilized or modern (being in 21th century). It has to do with advantage of the community. Everybody likes unity and unity is beneficial most of the time, however it very destructive when it is not what it should be. Former or current Ethiopian rulers are wearing the name unity on top but their real identity is very different. Unity never ever hinders you from exercising your social, economic and political right in the unity. However, none of the Ethiopian rulers have been giving these rights. These happened not without reason. Unity should come based on the willingness and advantage of the communities comprising the unity. Oromo people and other have never been asked for any suggestion to be part of the unity (Ethiopia), rather by ruthless killing, robbery and erasing their identity. Unity form the top (Boss) to down has always defect, better if from bottom to top. To be open, at least 75% Oromo intellectuals believe they are not Ethiopian, I do so. This is because I hate unity but the way the unity is being implemented. We hear only on media that Oromia is part of Ethiopia. The students and the community at large rarely believe they are Ethiopian, because they believe that the name unity has taken their freedom.
Unity is different from having blood either. There are a lot of mixed Ethiopian in the globe, America, Europe and other parts of the world who are 10%, 25%, or 50 % Ethiopian. None of them are opposing the freedom of their respective country. They either think that they are nationals of the country or believe they are Ethiopian but they are governed by the country. So taking about Oromo, Oromia is not about blood component rather it is about freedom in the territory. Talking about other regions freedom may looks good to you but you should change yourself before you try to change others.
Dear Kassu,
Thank you for your view in my comment,
I believe, talking about unity by no means a measurement for being civilized or modern (being in 21th century). It has to do with advantage of the community. Everybody likes unity and unity is beneficial most of the time, however it very destructive when it is not what it should be. Former or current Ethiopian rulers are wearing the name unity on top but their real identity is very different. Unity never ever hinders you from exercising your social, economic and political right in the unity. However, none of the Ethiopian rulers have been giving these rights. These happened not without reason. Unity should come based on the willingness and advantage of the communities comprising the unity. Oromo people and other have never been asked for any suggestion to be part of the unity (Ethiopia), rather by ruthless killing, robbery and erasing their identity. Unity from the top (Boss) to down has always defect, better if from bottom to top. To be open, at least 75% Oromo intellectuals believe they are not Ethiopian, I do so. This is not because I hate unity but the way the unity is being implemented. We hear only on media that Oromia is part of Ethiopia. The students and the community at large rarely believe they are Ethiopian, because they believe that the name unity has taken their freedom.
Unity is different from having varieties of blood component either. There are a lot of mixed Ethiopian in the globe, America, Europe and other parts of the world who are 10%, 25%, or 50 % Ethiopian. None of them are opposing the freedom of their respective country. They either think that they are nationals of the country or believe they are Ethiopian but they are governed by the country. So talking about Oromo, Oromia is not about blood component rather it is about freedom in the territory. Talking about other regions freedom as well may looks good to you but you should change yourself before you try to change others.
Dear Jawar, Galatoomi . Barreeffamni tun hedduu natti tolte.
Hope that the Ethiopian Junta has some web observers who asses the level of public awareness even beyond national boundary. THey always attempt to rationalize that democracy never happens overnight, yet….
>over 90% of top military leadership is concentrated in the hands of TPLF warlords
>All security and intelligence machinery is strictly in the hands tigre insiders
> Recently I heard an embittered old Guraghe man talking about the shift of ethnic composition of addis ababa. According to that man, Guraghes were about 19% of the population of addis ababa when derg was toppled. Twenty years latter, Guraghe has diminished to some 4% , while tigre, has come close to 20% of
addis ababa population from a meager 3% 20 year s back. why did they flock to addis in such an exodus?
Don’t worry they will end up fertilizers in our land with milk, butter and honey they consumed. This is an inevitable of minority ruling and oppressing majority. Wait and see. They will be drawned in the see of oppressed nations.The wealth they were stealing from oromos coffee and gold and sales of land will be accounted just like Gadafi’s and his families 131 billion US dollars which was to be paid back to Libyan people soon. IN USA only Gadafi has 31 billion US dollars wealth registered in his name and President Obama is promising to pay back to the LIbyans. Both British and French already paid big sum of the stolen money to the Libyans.
The Egyptian president and his two sons and wife also stolen 41
billion US dollars from the poor egyptian people and this money also started to be paid back.
The surprising thing about this palace thiefs is the Tunisisan president and his wife owned 45% of Tunisian wealth (both in cash and property). The Tunsian president Bin Ali’s wife is called Laila Trapolis (She is a LIbyan from Tripoli). The tunsian wealth belonged to her and her 11 brothers -may be they are her boy friends). Most of her brothers are detained and she is in Hiding in IMarat and she is wanted in Tunsia.
What about males’s Azeb? Thanks to some of our Eritrean friends the property the Wayanes bought in ithe name of Agame sharmutas/prostutes is well known and registered in the city of dubai. Azeb thinks she is smart than Laila or MUbarak’s wife Su,zan MUbark but when the time comes she is just rubbish flesh, too old even to be prostute which most of their tigray girls know very well.
Obbol Jawaar
Your essay is powerfully informative and fascinating to read as usual!
I love reading your writings !! Hope oromia shall produce young as many as young and vibrant and consistent fellow of your kind bro!
Guddadhu!!
Hi Jo,
Recently, I have tried to follow what u have in mind regarding situations in Ethiopia. I don’t think you are inspired by real cause foer all ppl of Ethiopia. You want to score a point against the current govt as a vendetta to your lost close friend during a useless “war” between OLF and EPRDF. Hate won’t get you nowh
Hi Jo,
Recently, I have tried to follow what u have in mind regarding situations in Ethiopia. I don’t think you are inspired by real cause for all ppl of Ethiopia. You want to score a point against the current govt as a vendetta to your lost close friend during a useless “war” between OLF and EPRDF. Think of how many soul lost in senseless way in the past…if everyone goes for vendetta we can’t have a country of ours. Hate won’t get you nowhere !!
Your shallow analysis about Libya and Syria vis_a_vis Ethiopia can’t hold water. Historically, culturally and the foundations of the nation are different. As long as you support separatist agenda, there is no way that you shed light on the current situation of our country. Whatever dressing you use, you can’t be taken seriously.
Teo@
1. Jawar has never talked about vendetta, rather he is giving an excellent lecture ever regarding the structure of unsustainable Ethiopia’s state apparatus and the consequence of such fault
2. As person a who lived in Libya for years and reading different article about establishment of states/government in Syria, I have to say simple thing; Jawar is “RIGHT”
3. Jawar is not a separatist as you have said and has never advocated separation either.
I’m not always agree on everything with Jawar, but I must applaud him on this article due to his excellent insight
Mr. Teo, If you oppose others’ point of view, don’t talk rubbish and lie … try to be reasonable man
Hi Abdisa,
1. That is my personal observation based on his recent showings. If he doesn’t have personal or party agenda to promote, I expect balanced view of the current situation with regards democratic, economic, social issues considering level of eduction and pverty in the contry. When he talks of Libya and Syria, that means he is implying that the situation is going that way which in my opinion is wrong.
2. Your stay in Libya could be enough to conclude that “establishment of states/government in Syria” si similar to that of ours. Come again with basic similarities and differences.
3. That is my impression based on my observation recently. I would love to see his comments regarding his vision for Ethiopia or Oromia for that matter……
The rest is history……. ready to learn from you! sorry for my english!
Thank you Jewar. Very insightful and informative analysis. I have a question though. How significant are the impacts of the roles of the personal attributes of the dictators and the international community in the context of Ethiopia? Would the departure of such an imposing personality as dictator Meles significantly impact the cohesion within the TPLF? Meles knew that given the political landscape in the country it would not be possible for him to obtain legitimacy inside Ethiopia. Therefore, he cleverly sought one outside the borders of Ethiopia by curving out a role for himself in the Horn region and in the international arena mainly based on his own personal attributes. That undoubltedly helped him consolidate his power within the TPLF thereby preventing the occurance of cracks along various faultlines within the group or within the ethnic minority it claims to represent. It seems to me that whoever emerges as the successor from the TPLF would not have the international stature of Meles to obtain legitimacy from outside Ethiopia hindering his/her role in maintaining the cohesion. What would be its chances of standing together if and when it comes under domestic or international pressure given the dependence of the TPLF regime on foreign aid? Can you bring the analysis a notch or two down to the the realities and circumstances in Ethiopia today?
Dear Juhar, I have been waiting what you pen down since uncertainity occured in Ethiopia. Great presentation, nice analysis and inforamtive essay. I have always been your admirer.( Baga kheenya taate boo.)
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Jawar
The Article Well Analyzed and very clear for some one read with open mind.
Bravo Jawar Keep it-up Lecturing and Fighting for the truth.
I think we need more young Generation like you.
I wish “you will be a Next African Brack Obama”.
Thanks Bro.
I am very Proud of you
You Wrote: “He had been implementing policies that further increase inequality between Tigreans and the rest, and this has been helping further entrench the interest groups, and raise the cost of redistribution.”
You statement is factually wrong – you need to more research to better state it. -
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It used to be the norm for amharas to claim to be and considered ‘Unionist’ , Ethiopianist and Oromos considered ‘separtist’. In reverse of the reality, Amharas say they love ‘Ethiopia’. That directly or in directlly means loving ‘Amharic language’,'Orthodox christanity’ and ‘Habsha dress’ but they don’t fell it means loving Sidama, loving Hadiya, loving Gurage, loving Wolayeta,loving Oromo but Oromos who have been told not to speak Afan oromo and talk about ‘Gada’ for 100 years and forced to stayed of being inferior and poor and gun down in protesting these believed in Ethiopia,then who is the real separatist one incapable of tolerance needed to live in diversity.In consideration of all these I thought from now on ward if things go wrong in this country it won’t get wright and the world in general and Africa in particular will witness the turbulent horn of Africa being redrawn you don’t need to bother by whom and when ‘Oromo’s’ are more than enough to do so. There is no Libya or Syria scenario.
nice point of view
i want to ask u jewhar the story of 1 ethinic group in power make them similar with the two arab countries but what do u think their psychology of suprierity(tigrian) especially associated with power of rulling after amharas they r dominants in ethiopian ruling history.
i think the libyan and syrian minority dont think like this.
Tola and sena u want to do again what tigrian and amhara done in ethiopia for 2000 years we dont need this type of thinking for ethiopia.
If u think so never oromos copup the power in ethiopia even for the moments
i am soory to say this but thinking like this is backwardness .
All I can say is WOW!! You have stunned me with the amount a valuable reading here
let unblock Gulele post in Ethiopia
use the suffix ‘s’ after http i.e. https://www.gulelepost.com
The oromos need to replicate the Lybyan modelr revolution but saddly that brutal facist males is gone before getting his price at the hands of the people like that stupid gadafi of Gaddaffa/Sirte tribe which is the same with the Agame of tigraye.
MUSTFA.
THINKS FROM ALL PEOPLE OROMO WILL NEVER COME TO POWER. WHAT A LOSER, EVERYONE IS SCARED OF OROMO LEADERS BECAUSE EMPIRE ETHIOPIA IS USED TO GET F BY DICTAOTRS. THEY DONT LIKE EQUALITY LIKE OROMO WANTS AND THEY ARE BADLY AFRICAN WHO LIKE TO BE BEATEN BY DICTATORS.
OROMO HATES DESPISE DICTATORS AND EVERY AFRICAN MONKEY HATE THEM BECAUASE THEY USED TO THAT SYSTEM ONLY.
UNLESS OROMO EMPOWER THEMSELVES, RUNNING AROUND WITH LOSERS FOR EQUALITY NEVER WORKS.